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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the identity of the substance, it would seriously impair the effec-
tiveness of the statute. The court could adopt a compromise posi-
tion by holding that proof of defendant's possession of a narcotic
drug would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the de-
fendant knew the substance in question to be a narcotic. This
procedure has been successfully used by the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington, 19 and has the effect of largely pre-
serving the effectiveness of the statute in combatting traffic in
narcotics.
Albert L. Dietz, Jr.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SHORT FORM INDICTMENT -
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Defendant was convicted under a bill of information which
charged that he did "unlawfully maliciously and feloniously com-
mit gambling as denounced by Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title
14, Section 90." Additional information concerning the precise
manner in which the crime had been committed was furnished
defendant in a bill of particulars. On appeal defendant contended
that the bill of information should have been quashed by the
trial court, as it did not properly inform him "of the nature and
cause of the accusation," as required by article I, section 10,
Louisiana Constitution of 1921.1 The Louisiana Supreme Court
held, reversed. 2 Section 1 of Act 223 of 1944,8 amending article
235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,4 insofar as it provides
that "it shall be sufficient to charge the defendant by using the
name and article number of the offense committed," is violative
of article I, Section 10, Louisiana Constitution of 1921. The na-
ture and cause of the offense must be fully stated in the initial
criminal charge, and the bill of particulars can in no way sup-
plement a deficient indictment or information. State v.
Straughan, 229 La. 1036, 87 So.2d 523 (1956).
19. State v. Wooten, 44 Wash.2d 177, 266 P.2d 342 (1954). The court in this
case applies this procedure in cases involving the crime of illegal sale of narcotics.
The same principle would apply, however, to unlawful possession of narcotics.
1. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him...
2. Justices Hamiter, Hawthorne, and McCaleb dissenting.
3. La. Acts 1944, No. 223, § 1, p. 661; now LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950).
4. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950). Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
sets forth a specific short form indictment for each of 22 of the more important
and recurring crimes.
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NOTES
The common law indictment form, with its prolixity of alle-
gations, was developed during the time of Blackstone when there
were some 200 capital crimes,5 and when the courts were ever
sympathetic to any device which would prevent an accused from
being convicted." With punishment reduced in severity,7 so that
only a few crimes presently carry capital punishment or manda-
tory long prison sentences, the long form indictment is frowned
upon as a technical loophole for the accused. 8 In 1928 the Louisi-
ana Legislature followed the trend toward simplicity by adopt-
ing article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which author-
izes short form indictments for a number of the more important
and recurring offenses.9 The purpose of the short form is to do
away with the verbose common law charge and to provide an
accurate but terse form of indictment.10 It has been held that use
of the short form does not violate a defendant's constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charge
against him;" he is clearly notified of the crime charged and
may look to the statutory definition to determine its various ele-
ments; he may elicit any other relevant information as to the
"nature and cause" through a bill of particulars. 12 In upholding
the constitutionality of article 235, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has often said that, when the short form is used, the defendant
is entitled of right (with certain practical limitations)13 to a bill
5. PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 127 (1953).
6. 1 CIIITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 114 (1819).
7. PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 129 (1953).
8. Comment, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 461 (1945).
9. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950).
10. See Bennett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
16 (1944).
11. State v. Holmes, 223 La. 397, 65 So.2d 890 (1953) ; State v. Nichols, 216
La. 622, 44 So.2d 318 (1950) ; State v. Chanet, 209 La. 410, 24 So.2d 670 (1946) ;
State v. Davis, 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945) ; State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078,
20 So.2d 368 (1944) ; State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931). See also
Comment, 35 Mici. L. REV. 456 (1937) ; Comment, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
78 (1944).
12. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950) : ... Provided further that the district attorney,
if requested by the accused prior to arraignment, may be required by the judge
to furnish a bill of particulars setting up more specifically the nature of the
offense charged."
13. These practical limitations are: (1) The defense cannot force the state to
disclose its evidence in advance of trial. State v. Fernandez, 157 La. 149, 102 So.
186 (1924). (2) The defense cannot force the state to choose in advance between
responsive verdicts. State v. Iseringhausen, 204 La. 593, 16 So.2d 65 (1943).
(3) Only facts and not legal conclusions need be given in a bill of particulars.
State v. Rollins, 153 La. 10, 95 So.2d 264 (1922). (4) State not required to fur-
nish a bill of particulars where it would be useless and would not aid accused in
preparing his defense because of their immateriality. State v. Alford, 206 La.
100, 18 So.2d 666 (1944). (5) State does not have to furnish particulars when
such particulars are not available. State v. Clark, 124 La. 965, 50 So. 811
19561
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of particulars 14 and his constitutional right to be informed is
thereby fully protected. 15 This is in accord with decisions of
other states having constitutional and statutory provisions sim-
ilar to those of Louisiana.16
In 1944 article 235 was amended to provide that "in all cases
of crime included in the Criminal Code but not covered by the
short forms hereinbefore set forth, it shall be sufficient to charge
the defendant by giving the name and article number of the of-
fense committed."'17 The amended article received immediate in-
terpretation. In State v. Davis1 it was held that the use of an
indictment for gambling stating only the name and article num-
ber of the crime satisfied the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the offense; this right
was further satisfied by the bill of particulars furnished by the
district attorney upon request of the defendant. This case, as
well as the ones construing article 235 as originally enacted, sug-
gests that the indictment is not the only means of informing the
(1909). For a complete discussion of these limitations, see Comment, 12 LOuISIANA
LAw REVIEW 457 (1952).
14. State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46 So.2d 262 (1950) ; State v. Masino, 214
La. 744, 38 So.2d 622 (1949) ; State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So.2d 785 (1948).
See also State v. Holmes, 223 La. 397, 406, 65 So.2d 890, 892 (1953), where the
court stated that where a short form information is used, but it does not set
forth sufficient facts to inform accused of nature and cause of accusation so as
to enable him to prepare his defense properly, or it fails to allege essential ele-
ments of crime sought to be charged, accused is entitled to be furnished such de-
tails on timely requesting them by way of application for bill of particulars.
15. State v. Holmes, 223 La. 397, 65 So.2d 890 (1953); State v. Nichols.
216 La. 622, 44 So.2d 318 (1950) ; State v. Chanet, 209 La. 410, 24 So.2d 670
(1946) ; State v. Davis, 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945) ; State v. Pete, 203 La.
1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944) ; State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931).
16. It should be noted that only two states have provisions similar to those
of Louisiana. Eleven state constitutions, including Louisiana's, guarantee that
an accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Of these
eleven states, only three (Louisiana, New York, and Rhode Island) have adopted
provisions authorizing the charging of crimes by statutory number and/or com-
mon law designation. See ALI, CODE OF CRTMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 154, 155, com-
ments. New York's highest court, in approving their provisions, has said that the
bill "must state such particulars as may be necessary to give the defendant and
the court reasonable information as to the nature and character of the crime
charged." State v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 1.6, 24, 171 N.E. 890, 893, 69 A.L.RI.
1378, 1383 (1930). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that the bill of
particulars shall be furnished in order "to fully protect the accused." State v.
Domanski, 57 R.I. 500, 505, 190 Atl. 854, 857 (1937).
17. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950) : ". . . Provided that in all cases of crimes in-
cluded in the Criminal Code but not covered by the short forms hereinabove set
forth, it shall be sufficient to charge the defendant by using the n'mie and article
number of the offense committed." The new short form was in line with a sug-
gestion in the ALI, MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 154(a) (1931), to
the effect that crimes might be charged "by using the name given to the offense
by the common law or by a statute."
18. 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945), 6 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 715 (1946).
NOTES
defendant of the "nature and cause of the accusation.agaimt-
him" ;19 the bill of particulars also serves as a vehicle for furnii-
ing such information. 0
In the instant case the 1944 amendment to article 235 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure was declared "null and void, and of
no effect" 21 as "all of the essential facts necessary to describe the
nature and cause of the offense must be incorporated in the
initial charge, which must be by indictment or information." 22
The court specifically overruled the Davis case and indirectly
repudiated the many statements in prior decisions to the effect
that the accused's right to be informed is amply protected by.a
bill of particulars specifically setting forth the nature and cause
of the offense charged. In discussing some of these prior deci-
sions involving aggravated rape, manslaughter, simple burglary,
and murder, the court noted that "a mere reading of the charge
in the indictment or information in these cases will disclose con-
vincingly that they met the generally accepted test for constitu-
tional sufficiency, i.e., (1) they were sufficient to inform the
court of the exact offense being charged so that the court could
properly regulate the evidence sought to be introduced, (2) they
informed the accused of the nature and cause of the offense
charged so that he could properly prepare his defense, and (3)
they were sufficient on their face to support a plea for former
jeopardy in the event of a subsequent attempt to try the defend-
ant for the same offense. '23 To exemplify its notion of a consti-
tutionally sufficient bill of information, the court cited a theft
case, State v. Pete,24 wherein it was charged that the defendant
did "unlawfully commit the theft of an automobile, of the value
of Twelve Hundred and no/100 ($1200.00) Dollars, the property
of Gordons Drug Store, Inc., a corporation." This information
was considered sufficient although the theft might have been
committed through embezzlement, larceny, obtaining by false
19. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
20. See dissent in State v. McQueen, 87 So.2d 727, 734 (1956). Justice Mc-
Caleb states that "the Constitution guaranteed defendant the right to be apprised
of the nature and cause of the accusation; it did not specify that the prosecution
shall be abated if the necessary information is not stated in the bill of information
or indictment. On the contrary . . . all of the cases upholding the short forms pro-
vided by Article 235 are predicated upon the premise that the bill of particulars,
which is available to the defendant under specific provisions, sufficiently protects
him in his constitutional rights."
21. State v. Straughan, 229 La. 1036, 1078, 87 So.2d 523, 538 (1956).
22. Id. at 1072, 87 So.2d at 536.
23. Id. at 1047, 87 So.2d at 527.
24. 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944).
19561
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
pretenses; ii confidence game violation, or any of several other
offenses which have been cumulated in the single crime of theft.25
Considering the court's approval in the Straughan case of the
use of the short form indictment in cases involving theft, aggra-
vated rape, manslaughter, simple burglary, and murder, it would
appear that the Straughan decision does not preclude the use of
the short form to charge well-understood crimes, even though
they may be susceptible of commission in a number of ways. On
the other hand, the decision precludes any use of the super-abbre-
viated short form authorized by the 1944 amendment, which per-
mitted the use of such indictments for charging crimes of a
multifarious nature, such as gambling or obscenity which do not
have a well-understood nature and cause. For charging these
latter crimes, it will be necessary to use the form of indictment
prescribed by article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that
is to say, that "the indictment must state every fact and circum-
stance necessary to constitute the offense, but it need do no more,
and it is immaterial whether the language of the statute creating
the offense, or words unequivocally conveying the meaning of
the statute be used. ' '2
Thomas D. Hardeman
LEGISLATION - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REQUIREMENT THAT
EACH BILL MUST BE READ ON THREE DIFFERENT DAYS
IN EACH HOUSE
Plaintiff alleged the unconstitutionality of an act of the
Louisiana Legislature' on the ground that it had not been read
on three different days in each House of the Legislature as re-
quired by article III, section 24, of the Louisiana Constitution.2
The Journal indicates that the bill was read on only two days in
the Senate, twice on the day it was received from the House
and again when it was passed the next day. Defendant contended
that the bill was valid nonetheless, arguing that the constitu-
tional provision is not mandatory and that a presumption of
compliance with the Constitution should control. 3 On appeal
25. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950). See Morrow, The 19112 Louisiana Criminal Code
in 1945: A Small Voice from the Past, 19 TUL. L. REv. 483 (1945) ; Ralston, Suf-
ficiency of the Charge in an Indictment in Louisiana, 20 TUL. L. REV. 220 (1946).
26. LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
1. La. Acts 1954, No. 536, p. 1001, incorporated as LA. R.S. 47:2190 (1950).
2. "Every bill shall be read on three different days in each house .... " (Em-
phasis added.) LA. CONST. art. III, § 24.
3. Both of these contentions were made by defendant in his brief, but the court
[Vol. XVII
